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In 2016, Singapore saw a conference with the ambitious title “Doing Business 
Across Asia: Legal Convergence in an Asian Century”. 1  Amongst other things, the 
conference celebrated the inauguration of an Asian Business Law Institute (ABLI).2 
The keynote address was given by Sundaresh Menon, Chief Justice of the Republic of 
Singapore and chair of ABLI’s board of governors.3 Menon invoked the demands of 
globalization and lamented the fragmentation of laws in Asia as appearing “somewhat 
out of kilter”. Legal convergence, he suggested, was necessary because “a fragmented 
Asia is holding business back;” inconsistent regulations and regimes across the Asia-
Pacific were the single biggest barrier to trade. Menon juxtaposed this situation in 
Asia with that in Africa, where the Organization for the Harmonization of Business 
Laws (OHADA) had made significant progress towards unification. That success could 
not be copied, however: “A world with an identical legal framework that applies in 
every space would neither be realistic nor even desirable. Laws reflect political, social 
and economic realities and these realities are not evenly flat even in an otherwise 
                                                        
* Thanks for extremely valuabe advice  on earlier drafts to Naoki Kanayama, 
Annelise Riles, Teemu Ruskola, and  Maartje de Visser, as well as workshop 
participants at Kyoto University, where Nakata Kunihiro provided insightful 
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1 For information on the conference, see 
http://www.ije.be/img/user/files/pdf-en/doingbusinessacrossasia.pdf 
2 http://abli.asia/. 
3 Sundaresh Menon, Doing Business Across Asia: Legal Convergence in an 
Asian Century, https://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/news/speeches/chief-justice-
sundaresh-menon--doing-business-across-asia--legal-convergence-in-an-asian-
century.  
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flattening world.“4 “The conditions in Asia are different and we must find what best 
suits our needs.”5 
On its face, such a plea for convergence sounds familiar to European observers. 
The dual invocation of matters of trade and business on the one hand, political and 
social commonalities on the other, seems familiar from discussions about legal 
unification in Europe. The European Union has always invoked both aspects, as have 
proponents of a European Civil Code. On the one hand, legal unification is often said 
to be necessary for trans-border commerce. Such commercial justification underlies 
much EU law; it has also repeatedly been brought up in favor of a European civil code. 
On the other hand, legal unification in Europe is regularly linked to an idea of a 
European cultural identity.6 Behind these two justifications are two ideas about what 
Europe is. For the commercial justification, Europe is an optimal market, facilitated 
through the institution of the European Union. Nothing much hinges on a more 
precise definition of Europe that goes beyond such economic considerations. Or, put 
differently, the definition of Europe is institutional: it hinges on membership in the 
European Union. For the cultural justification, by contrast, Europe is a natural unity, 
bound together by a common culture, a common history, a common background in 
religion and subsequent secularization. Here, therefore, the idea of Europe is 
substantive. 
Can the same be said about Asia? Is there an Asian identity comparable to 
European identity and therefore similarly useful as a justification for unification 
projects? If so, what does it look like? And if so, does this make Asia more like Europe, 
or less so? Or is this question itself already a mere European projection? When Menon 
speaks of different conditions in Asia, what are these? When he speaks of Asia’s needs, 
and what exactly suits them best, is he talking only economics or also culture? In 
short: what is meant by ‘Asia?’ And when we speak of Asian law, what makes law 
Asian? 
This chapter tries to address such questions. In particular, I look at a concrete 
project of Asian law unification—the Principles of Asian Comparative Law—and 
connect discussions about its Asian identity with four concepts of Asia. The first such 
concept is a European idea of Asia and Asian law, which defines a presumably 
homogeneous Asia on the basis of its level of difference from Europe. The next three 
concepts are concepts that emerged from Asian debates. Two off them explicitly 
invoke leadership of one country. A sinocentric concept of Asian law attempts to 
reinvigorate concepts from the time of Chinese dominance of East Asia prior to 
                                                        
4 Id. at p. 12. 
5 Id. at p. 7. 
6 Nils Jansen, Binnenmarkt, Privatrecht und europäische Identität—Eine 
historische und methodische Bestandsaufnahme (Mohr/Siebeck 2003); Stephanie 
Law, From Multiple Legal Cultures to One Legal Culture? Thinking About Culture, 
Tradition and Identity in European Private Law Development, Utrecht Journal of 
International and European Law. 31(81), pp.68–89. 
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colonization. A Japanese concept of Pan-Asian law by contrast is built on Japanese 
modernization, which in turn was influenced by Europe. Finally, the idea of Asian 
values attempts to avoid leadership by any one country in favor of a truly Asian 
identity. None of these three chapters can fully avoid the central problems of the 
European projection: they are all defined by their relation to the West, and all of them 
invoke a relative degree of homogeneity as basis for identity. I close, therefore, with 
an alternative concept of Asia “as method” that attempts to overcome these two 
shortcomings and may offer a more promising path towards an idea of Asian law. 
I. Asian Law? The Example Principles of Asian Contract Law 
If the ABLI discussion largely avoids discussions on an Asian identity, another 
project has generated such a debate: the Principles of Asian Contract Law (PACL).7  
Their origin lies in a proposal made by Naoki Kanayama, Professor for French law at 
Keio University in Japan, during a conference at Tsinghua University 2009 for an 
Asian project after the model of the PECL. The project was inaugurated on the spot 
with what Shinyuan Han, professor of civil law at Tsinghua University in China, calls 
the “Beijing declaration”. 8  It involves a good number of East and Souteast Asian 
countries, has since led to a number of conferences, country reports and draft 
chapters towards a final product.  
                                                        
7 Shiyuan Han, Principles of Asian Contract Law: An Endeavor of Regional 
Harmonization of Contract Law in East Asia, (2013) 58 Villanova Law Review 589-
599; Mary E. Hiscock, The universality of good faith and moral behaviour: A 
challenge for the principles of Asian contract law, in Legal Thoughts between the 
East and the West in the Multilevel Legal Order: A Liber Amicorum in Honour of 
Professor Herbert Han-Pao Ma 355-367 (Chang-fa Lo, Nigel Li, LinTsai-yu Lin eds., 
2016); Jung-Joon Ka, Introduction to PACL, in: Tony Angelo – Luca Castellani – Yves-
Louis Sage (eds),  Contributions to the study of international trade law and 
alternative dispute resolution in the South Pacific (2014) 55-65; Naoki Kanayama, 
PACL (Principles of Asian Civil/Commercial Law) (in French), [2010] Revue des 
contrats 995-1006 , revised and updated as  Kanayama, PACL (Principles of Asian 
Civil Law) (in French), in : Mélanges Jean-Louis Baudouin 393-419 (Benoît Moore 
ed., Éditions Yvon Blais, 2012) (hereinafter Kanayama, Mélanges Badouin), further 
revised and updated as  Kanayama, PACL (Principles of Asian Contract Law) (in 
French), in Droit japonais, droit français, Quel dialogue ? (Béatrice Jaluzot ed., 
Schulthess, 2014) p. 185-196 (hereinafter Kanayama, Quel dialogue?); Young-June 
Lee, The basic direction of the Principles of Asian Contract Law (in Korean, with 
Chinese and Japanese translations), 3 Asia Private Law Review Arts. 23-25 ; Lee, 
Introduction to the Draft Articles, (2014) 4 Asia Private Law Review 3-11. (The Asia 
Private Law Review is available at http://www.kcjlaw.co.kr/.)  
8 Kanayama, Mélanges Boudouin (n. ___)  398; Han (n. ___) 590-91. 
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The PACL are being conceived in view of existing non-Asian Restatements like 
PECL and UPICC; in addition, the Convention on the International Sale of Goods has 
served as an inspiration.9 The form of the project is very similar to that of its Western 
predecessors: to present, in the form of rules, a Restatement of Asian contract law, 
based on research into existing laws. Its proposed functions also resemble those of 
PECL and UPICC: to serve as a model law for modernization, and to offer themselves 
as an applicable law in transnational contracts.10 Even the language of the product 
(and of the preparatory work) is the same as for the PECL and PICC, namely English—
not a language native to Asia. 
Beyond that, however, there are important differences with the work on the 
PECL. While authors of the PECL and the UPICC strongly emphasize their desire to 
transcend national law, this seems less prominent with the PACL, which focus more 
on representation of national systems and on national reports. No centralized 
national background exists, so the projects rests on the shoulders of the national 
groups, which are in charge of most of the work. Even the drafting of sections of the 
PACL were left first to representatives of national groups, before the results were 
discussed and voted upon. A number of such draft sections have been drafted: the 
sections on performance and non-performance, prepared by the Korean delegation, 
are available.11 Moreover, two participants from Singapore have published the first 
two of an intended six volumes of essays in a series entitled “Studies in the Contract 
Laws of Asia,” based on work towards the PACL, though they are no longer involved 
in the project.12  
The PACL are not the first project aimed at restating Asian contract law. Earlier 
proposals exist for an ASEAN project based on the UPICC and PECL.13  A predecessor 
                                                        
9 Han (n. Error! Bookmark not defined.) 591-2. 
10 Kanayama, Mélanges Boudouin (n. ___)  396-7. 
11 Draft articles non-performance of contract for principles of Asian contract 
law, (2010) Asia Private Law Review No, 4 special; Young Jun Lee (ed.,) A study on 
draft articles, principles of Asian contract law : performance & non-performance, 
(2016) Asia Private Law Review No. 7 special. 
12 Mindy Chen-Wishart, Alexander Loke, and Burton Ong (eds), Remedies for 
Breach of Contract (OUP 2016); Mindy Chen-Wishart, Alexander Loke, and Stefan 
Vogenauer (eds), Formation and Third Party Beneficiaries (OUP 2018). The other 
intended  volumes deal with contents of contracts and unfair terms, invalidity of 
contract, ending and changing contracts, and public policy and illegality. 
13 Lim Yew Nghee, ‘UNIDROIT Principles—A Model for the Harmonization of 
ASEAN Contract Law’ [1997] Singapore L. Rev 355; R Amoussou-Guenou, 
‘Perspectives des Principes Asean (ou Asiatiques) du droit des contrats’ [2005] Int’l 
Bus LJ 573; B Hardjowahono, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles and the Law Governing 
Commercial Contracts in Southeast Asia’ [2002] ULR 1005, especially 1010–1011 
and 1013–1014; B Hardjowahono,  The Unification of Private International Law on 
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project  under the guidance of the then-new Law Association for Asia and the Western 
Pacific led to a book edited by three scholars from the University of Tasmania, but 
relying on reports from scholars from a number of other Asian countries. 14  The 
editors of that book decided in favor of a comprehensive presentation of contract law 
in Asia rather than on country report in view of the fact that such country reports 
would be very repetitive, given that most laws in Asia are based on either civil or 
common law.15 An unfortunate consequence of this focus was that the editors saw 
themselves unable to include detailed comparison with legal systems outside of this 
dichotomy, for example Islamic or Chinese law.16 They were mindful, throughout the 
book, of the practical problems that emerge from imposing Western law on countries 
with very different traditions, including the inadequacy of both Western concepts and 
Western solutions for local problems. Nonetheless, the discussion of concrete 
problems could not avoid going along Western trajectories, and it does not, in the end 
become clear what makes the project particularly Asian, other than that it is not 
European.17 
  In the PACL project, this question of how Asian a project of Asian contract law 
should be has been discussed, and created different answers. On the one side stands 
Shiyuan Han from Tsinghua University in Beijing, head of the Chinese delegation. He 
supports a specifically Asian nature for the PACL, suggesting that “the PACL as a 
model law should not be a simple copy of the PICC or the PECL,”18 because “the CISG 
was designed by European and American scholars and specialists. It reflects mainly 
the experiences of the western world. For East Asian people, it is still necessary for 
Asian scholars to produce an Asian voice.”19 “[T]o ‘uphold the ideal of a restatement’ 
means to draft a set of rules and principles appropriate for Asian people.”20 As a 
consequence, “if the PACL’s position is consistent with the custom of Asia and 
                                                        
International Commercial Contracts within the Regional Legal System of ASEAN 
(2005) 167–176; Samuel M.P. Hutabarat, ‘Remodelling ASEAN Contract Law: By 
Creating ASEAN’S Own Contract Law or By Adoption [of ] the Unidroit Principles’ 
(2012) 12 Law Review (Universitas Pelita Harapan) 215, 236 
(http://dspace.library.uph.edu:8080/handle/123456789/1092). 
14 D.E. Allan et al. (eds.), Asian Contract Law: A Survey of Current Problems 
(D.E. Allan, Mary E. Hiscock and Derek Roebuck eds., 1969); see also Hiscock (n. 7) 
358-60. 
15 D.E. Allan, Preface in Asian Contract Law (n. 14) ix, x. The book does 
contain, in addition to overview chapters for civil and common law respectively,  a 
brief chapter on adat contract law; ibid. at 72-78. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See also D. Heydon, Review, (1971) 34 Modern Law Review 118-120. 
18 Han (n. Error! Bookmark not defined.) 593. 
19 Han (n. Error! Bookmark not defined.) 591. 
20 Han (n. Error! Bookmark not defined.) 593. 
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different from the position of the CISG, we should rethink whether the CISG 
sufficiently addresses Asian customs.”21 Indeed, Han finds such Asian specificities, for 
example in the creditor’s right of subrogation and right of revocation, and in 
unilateral, as opposed to bilateral, release from a contract.22 His consequence for the 
working method is that the project would necessarily be thorough and take a long 
time. 23  In particular, it is necessary, in his view, to base the PACL on thorough 
comparative law of existing Asian laws, in order to make them compatible with what 
merchants are already aware of. Rules that are “appropriate for Asian people” should 
not, in his view, be too simple and abstract, or they will be of no use to judges. 
On the other side stands Naoki Kanayama from Keio University in Japan, head 
of the Japanese delegation. He does not disagree that the PACL should sometimes 
diverge from existing European models like PICC or PECL. However, his explanation 
is not a specific Asian character of the law, but a specific stage of modernity. 
Kanayama suggests that contemporary Asian law, and by implication the PACL, are 
by their nature European, and the difference between Japanese law and German or 
French law is not greater than the difference between French Law and German law. 
Law in Asia is an import from Europe, he suggests, but that does not imply inferiority: 
frequently copies can be better than originals. Kanayama calls any specifically Asian 
character of the PACL a “pure illusion”24 and suggests that not a single properly Asian 
element can be found in them;25 just as he suggests that the Japanese Civil Code has 
no particularly Asian quality.26  As a consequence, Kanayama proposes that the PACL 
could be written relatively quickly, given that European and international methods 
already existed. The result and that the emphasis should be on the formulation of 
simple and clear rules without extensive notes, more like the French Civil Code than 
the US Restatement.27  This became indeed the method followed by the Japanese 
working group under his leadership. 
What to make of this debate between Han and Kanayama? Is it idiosyncratic? 
Or does it reflect a deeper debate about the Asian nature of Asian law, a debate that 
would be instructive also to the Western observer? It seems to me that through the 
debate we can see remnants of a fundamental disagreement. It does not merely go to 
                                                        
21 Han (n. Error! Bookmark not defined.) 592; similarly Ka (n. 7) 65. 
22 Han (n. Error! Bookmark not defined.) 598. 
23 Id. 
24 Naoki Kanayama, Quel dialogue? (n. ___) 192-3. 
25 Id. at 194. For a largely similar view from the head of the Korea delegation, 
see Lee, Introduction (n. ___). 
26 Naoki Kanayama, Le caractère non-occidental du Minpo, mythe ou réalité ?, 
in Pierre Brunet, Ken Hasegawa & Hajime Yamamoto (eds), Rencontre franco-
japonaise autour des transferts de concepts juridiques (2014) 31-38 
27 Kanayama, Mélanges Baudouin (n. ) 406. 
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policy questions, a balancing between local culture and global commonality. Rather, 
it addresses the very question of what would even make a project like the PACL Asian, 
what it would mean for the project to be Asian. And it reflects very different ideas of 
what that might mean. 
II. A European Asia: Orientalism and Modernization  
What makes Asian law Asian? The first answer: the West does. As Chinese 
historian Wang Hui puts it, “Historically speaking, the idea of Asia is not Asian but, 
rather, European.”28 Asia, was a name given by outsiders, Europeans—first to depict 
a minuscule part of today’s Asia, later extended to the entire continent,. Term and 
concept did not arrive in East Asia before the Jesuits; they did not gain wide currency 
before the 19th century.29 Today, Asia describes, technically, the part of the Eurasian 
land mass that is on the other side than Europe from the Ural, an enormous territory 
with a multitude of cultures and countries and laws. In common parlance, however, 
Asia is often used in a narrower sense to describe East Asia, possibly in connection 
with South East Asia. In each case, Asia is a construct, and a primarily Western 
construct at that. And it is, at the same time, a geographical entity and a cultural 
concept.30 
As Asia is a Western concept, so is the idea of “Asian” law (as opposed to 
Chinese, or Buddhist, etc.). Courses in “Asian” or “East Asian” law have long been 
taught primarily in Europe and the United States, not in Asia.31 Chairs and Centers for 
“Asian law” exist in Europe and the United States, not in Asia, at least traditionally. At 
the National University of Singapore (which calls itself “Asia’s Global Law School”) 32, 
the Asian law Institute, which brings together law schools all across Asia, the Centre 
for Asian Legal Studies, and the Asian Journal of Comparative law, which it publishes, 
represent recent developments. The study of Asian law is also promoted elsewhere.33 
                                                        
28 Wang Hui, The politics of imagining Asia: a genealogical analysis (transl. 
Matthew A. Hale), (2007) 8 Intra-Asia Cultural Studies 1-33, 2; Ralph Weber, On 
Wang Hui's re-imagination of Asia and Europe, (2009) 17 Europa Regional 221-228.  
29 Christopher W. A. Szpilman and Sven Saaler, Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of 
Asian Identity and Solidarity, 1850–Present, The Asia-Pacific Journal 9.17.1 (April 
25, 2011). 
30 See Ruskola, Where is Asia (n. ) 881-3. 
31 See, e.g., Chin Kim, Asian Law and Comparative Legal Studies: A Proposed 
Curriculum Design, 5 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 91 (1982); Whitmore Gray, The 
Challenge of Asian Law, 19 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1-8 (1995). 
32 Simon Chesterman, ‘The Fall and Rise of Legal Education in Singapore’ 
[2017] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 201, 208-10. 
33 E.g. Sang-Yong Kim, The Necessity and the Methodology of Studies on 
Asian Law (2004) 1 Asia Law Review 1-19. 
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If Asian law is primarily a Western concept, what is its content? Essentially, 
there are two variants of such concepts. One is the idea of an essential difference: Asia 
is the opposite of Europe; it is everything that Europe is not.34 The strongest version 
of this view is the one that suggests that Asia has no law at all. We do indeed find such 
suggestions in scholarship.  René David explained that in the Far East, especially in 
China, law is only for barbarians, an opposition against law that is explained both with 
Confucian and with Maoist thought. 35  Zweigert and Kötz posit, somewhat more 
cautiously, that law matters, but not too much: informal means of dispute resolution 
are much more important. (They concede, in the third edition, that things are 
changing).36 Patrick Glenn sees Asian law as characterized especially by a relative 
absence of law, an emphasis on social harmony and a high importance of informal 
dispute resolution mechanisms.37 Ugo Mattei defines Asian law as traditional law, 
apparently in opposition to Western ‘professional’ law.38 
This view is now rightly viewed as problematic for a variety of reasons: it 
overestimates (ancient) history  and underestimates modern law in Asia, it reads 
even that ancient history only partially, and it uses as universal a notion of law that is 
intrinsically Western.39 The claim that formal law is irrelevant is certainly overrated 
for modern Asian legal systems. The frequent claim that Asians prefer informal 
dispute resolution mechanisms, for example, highlights cultural constraints at the 
cost of institutional conditions. The view is also problematic in their disproportionate 
focus on ancient history over contemporary developments. The focus on 
                                                        
34 See Teemu Ruskola, Where is Asia? When is Asia? Theorizing Comparative 
Law and International Law, (2011) 44 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 879. 
35 René David/John E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today 
(3rd ed. 1985) 30; see René David, Existe-t-il un Droit Occidental?, in XXTH 
CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW: LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
HESSEL E. YNTEMA 56, 60 (1961). Similarly e.g.  Michael Bogdan (2013), Concise 
Introduction to Comparative Law ch. 13; Peter de Cruz, Comparative Law in a 
Changing World (3rd ed. 2007) 209-10.  
36 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd ed. 
1998, Tony Weir transl.) 287-288.  
37 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (5th ed. 2014) ch. 9, pp 
319ff. 
38 Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s 
Legal Systems, Am. J. Comp. L. 45 (1997) 5, 35ff. 
39 See, especially, Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism (2013); see also Norman 
P. Ho, Internationalizing and Historicizing Hart's Theory of Law, 10 Wash. U. 
Jurisprudence Rev. 183 (2017). For differentiated conceptions in the introductory 
comparative law literature, see Dong Jiang, An Introduction to Chinese Legal 
Culture, in Søren Koch et al. (eds.), Comparing Legal Cultures (2017) 317, 327ff; 
Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (2nd ed. 2018) 94-96. 
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Confucianism tends to prioritize the past over the present and continuity over 
disruption; it also ignores the many other ideas and values that have shaped Asia40   
A different Western concept of Asian law responds and goes to the other 
extreme, viewing contemporary Asian law as essentially similar to Western law. From 
this perspective, laws in Asia can safely be understood as either civil law or common 
law; after the effective decline of communism, this is thought true even for Vietnam 
and China. The widely influential “Legal Origins” project sees only civil law and 
common law (and communist law) as legal families across the globe.41 From this 
perspective, the biggest conflict among Asian laws is, ironically, a quintessentially 
European conflict, namely that between civil and common law.42 
That approach is quite obviously also problematic: it underestimates the other 
legal cultures that shape law in Asia, and it underestimates the fact that Western law, 
born against the specific cultural, political and economic background of the West, 
operates very differently in Asian circumstances. The suggestion that laws in Asia are, 
essentially, no different from Western laws, makes sense only for a focus on formal 
law that ignores the interplay between formal law and society. Below the surface of 
formal rules, laws in Asian countries differ significantly from those in the West.43 
A third type of view suggests a middle way. Both views, in this view, err in 
opposite directions, and the truth is in the middle: Asian law is a little bit like 
European law and a little bit not. Or, a variant of this, Asian law is formally, on the 
surface, very much like European law, but substantively (as “living law”) is different. 
This view seems more accurate. But it is also imprecise and unsatisfactory to find that 
Asian law is somewhat like and somewhat unlike European law. And the distinction 
between form and substance is actually problematic as well: does such a distance not 
exist in Europe as well? 
                                                        
40 See Christoph Antons, What is ‘Asian law’? Asia in law, the humanities and 
social sciences, in Routledge Handbook of Asian Law (2017) 3-27. 
41 Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, Journal 
of Economic Literature 2008, 46:2, 285–332. 
42 See, e.g. Mary Hiscock, Remodelling Asian Laws, in INDONESIA: 
BANKRUPTCY, LAW REFORM & THE COMMERCIAL COURT 28-42 (Tim Lindsey ed., 
2000);  Margaret Fordham, Comparative Legal Traditions - Introducing the Common 
Law to Civil Lawyers in Asia, (2006) Asian Journal of Comparative Law Vol. 1, Issue 
1, Article 11; Alexander Loke, Insights from Comparing the Contract Laws of Asia on 
Formation and Third Party Beneficiaries, in Chen-Wishart/Loke/Vogenauer (n. ___ 
supra) 516-545; see also Kwai Hang Ng & Brynna Jacobson, How Global is the 
Common Law? A Comparative Study of Asian Common Law Systems – Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, and Singapore, Asian Journal of Comparative Law, 12 (2017), pp. 209–23. 
43 Masaji Chiba (ed.), Asian Indigenous Law in Interaction with Received Law 
(1986). 
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There is no need, here, to decide this. What matters more is to see how all three 
concepts, although in some ways diametrically opposed, they actually suffer from 
common shortcomings. Both views, that of difference and that of similarity, define 
Asian law primarily by its relation to Western law. They take European law as the 
universal standard against which Asian law as the particular is measured. Moreover, 
both exist against an assumed universal historical trajectory from informal to formal 
law; they only differ on how far along Asian law is on this trajectory. The main 
problem of such visions is, put simply, that it cannot take Asian law seriously on its 
own terms: it becomes a mere projection of Western ideas.  
A related problem is equally important: By defining Asian law purely in 
juxtaposition to Western law, it is given a unity that it does not have on its own. 
Patrick Glenn, in earlier editions of his book on comparative legal traditions, 
conceded that “Asia may exist more in western thinking than in Asian” and 
nonetheless posited the existence of “a kind of Asian default position, which must 
necessarily address all the particular traditions which the people of Asia have 
known”.44 After it was suggested to him that the concept is far too broad and what he 
means is, essentially, Chinese law,45 Glenn replaced in later editions the “Asian legal 
tradition” with a “Confucian legal tradition” where the focus explicitly narrows to 
China. 46  And yet, even a narrower East Asian legal tradition may today be a 
questionable entity, at least when compared to a Western legal tradition: even East 
Asia is more diverse in ideological, cultural, and religious terms than is Europe.47 
Nonetheless, in such presentations Japan’s place is unsure, Korean law is mostly 
absent altogether.48 
In the end, then, both the idea of Asian law as essentially different from and 
that of Asian law as essentially similar to Western law, suffer from the same 
shortcomings: they define Asian law only in relation to Western law, and they 
therefore ascribe to it a level of internal homogeneity and identity that are more 
                                                        
44 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in 
Law (2nd ed. 2004) 301ff.  
45 Andrew Huxley, Buddhist Law, Asian Law, Eurasian Law, (2006) Journal of 
Comparative Law 158, 160f; see also Uwe Kischel, Rechtsvergleichung (2015) § 9 
no. 3. 
46 See H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity 
in Law (5th  ed. 2014) 319ff. 
47 See Teemu Ruskola, The East Asian Legal Tradition, in Mauro Bussani/Ugo 
Mattei (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law (__) 257, 275f; see also 
Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3d ed 1998) 
287-8. 
48 Chongko Choi, Western Jurists on Korean Law: A Historical Survey, (2002) 
2 Journal of Korean Law 167-193, also in Choi, Law and Justcie in Korea (2005) 15ff. 
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projections than actual empirical truths. Asia is not Europe, but Asia is also not simply 
the opposite of Europe. These are not promising avenues. 
But is this already the whole story? Is a cultural identity of Asian law really 
merely a European projection? 49  Can we not find traces also within Asia? The 
European projections are not fully without an object, even though they define the 
object in problematic ways. They are constructs, but constructs have their own reality 
in the world. And although they were originally imposed on Asia from the outside, 
they spurred inner-Asian alternative concepts. 50  When we comparative lawyers 
attempt, to the extent we can, to understand debates from the inside rather than from 
the outside, we find inner-Asian projects of Asian identity of law, too. 
III. A Chinese Asia: Sinocentric Law 
  A first candidate for an Asian identity parallels the idea of difference. Such 
ideas of difference have often focused on China as stand-in for China, and indeed 
China is important for such concepts. Recall how Professor Han, in his presentation 
of the PACL, emphasizes China’s leadership (he refers to the founding document as 
the Beijing declaration51) and requests that it be sensitive to the multiculturalism to 
be found in Asia. These are contemporary suggestions,  but they implicitly relate to 
older ideas about Asia. 
The first of these ideas is the old idea of China as the Middle Kingdom, the 
center of a potentially universal political order. It established a view of China as a 
universal kingdom, which covered the entire (known) world (tianxia). The historical 
expression of that idea was the tributary system of the Ming and Qing dynasties.52 
Boundaries were social rather than geographical; the main distinction was that 
between civilization and barbarity, and the latter was defined by a refusal to accept 
the values of Chinese culture. Chinese hierarchy rested on power, but that power was 
mainly perceived to be cultural: China ruled (allegedly) not because it was powerful 
                                                        
49 This is the tendency, e.g., in Gayatri Chakravrty Spivak, Our Asias—2001: 
How to be a Continentalist, in id., Other Asias (Wiley-Blackwell 2007) 209ff. 
50 See Pekka Korhonen, Common Culture: Asia rhetoric in the beginning of 
the 20th century, (2008) 9 Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 395; Prasenjit Duara, Asia 
Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for Our Times, The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 69, 
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51 Han (n. ) 590. 
52 For scholarship linking the concept to the present, see, e.g., Li Zhaojie, 
Traditional Chinese World Order, Chines JIL 1 (2002) 20, 24ff; Fei-Ling Wang, From 
Tianxia to Westphalia: The Evolving Chinese Conception of Sovereignty and World 
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Sovereignty and International Legal Order (2015) 
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but because it had superior culture.53 Those nations that accepted this superiority 
engaged in tributary relations with the Chinese emperor, but these were, at least 
rhetorically, conceived less in terms of colonialism and subjugation and more on the 
basis of values: an autonomous acceptance of Chinese superiority on the one side, a 
government based on values on the other.54 The result, again somewhat idealistically, 
was a multicultural universalism: joined by the focus on China and the commitment 
to certain (Confucian) ideas, but otherwise internally plural. A “Beijing declaration” 
for the PACL can be viewed as a continuity of such ideas. 
The tributary system, of course, largely disappeared, at least for some time. 
The inherent multiculturalism, by contrast, was revived in connection with the 
influence of communism, the second important background idea. After World War I, 
Asian intellectuals became disenchanted when they realized that Wilsonian 
principles of self-determination were largely confined to European nations. Western 
nationalism was abhorred by many, both as representing everything that was bad 
about a Western fascination with rationality at the cost of culture, spirituality, and 
community, and as underlying the colonialist project. Leninism provided an 
alternative. Lenin had celebrated a revolutionary awakening of Asia as early as 
1913.55 His interest in Asia came from the hope of building alliances against Western 
capitalist nations, and of spurring revolutions in Asia rather than, as classical theory 
had predicted, in Europe. Asian attraction to Leninism on the other hand came not 
just from the opposition to the West as such. It also promised an alternative to the 
Western type of state and law, and an embrace of a multicultural idea of Empire, in 
accordance with similar such suggestions from Asia, most prominently perhaps by 
Sun-Yat Sen.56 Unlike tianxia, this now was an explicit idea of an Asian identity, one 
opposed to European concepts.57  
                                                        
53 See already John K. Fairbank, Tributary Trade and China’s Relation with 
the West, Far Eastern Quarterly 1 (1942) 129. 
54 Whether this is more a self-serving mythization than a historical fact is a 
different matter; see Peter C. Perdue, The Tenacious Tributary System, (2015) 24 
Journal of Contemporary China 1002-1014. 
55 V.I. Lenin, The Awakening of Asia, Pravda No. 103, May 7, 1913, translation 
at https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/may/07b.htm; Lenin,  
Backward Europe and Advanced Asia, Pravda No. 113, May 18, 1913, translation at 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/may/18.htm; see Shinkichi 
Etō, China’s international relations 1911-1931, in John K  Fairbank and Albert 
Feuerwerker (Eds.), The Cambridge History of China Vol. 13—Republican China 
1912-1949, Part 2 (1986) 74 at 107ff. 
56 See Wang Hui, The politics of imagining Asia: a genealogical analysis, 
(2007) 8 Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 1-33, 12-13. 
57 Wang Hui, supra n. ___, 11; see also Fei-Ling Wang, The China Order—
Centralia, World Empire, and the Nature of Chenese Power (2017) 209ff. 
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The consequence was, for some time, that law in several Asian countries bore 
some similarities to Chinese and, by extension, Soviet law. Soviet laws were 
transplanted early, in the short-lived Chinese Soviet Republic (1931-1934)58 Socialist 
law became influential again after revolutions in China, Vietnam, and other 
countries.59 Much of this borrowing occurred from the Soviet Union, not from China 
per se, given that Maoist law was more informal than the (civil-law based) law in the 
Soviet Union. 60  Yet, when China began to formalize its law after 1978 in a way 
different from both Europe and the Soviet Union, the new “socialist law with Chinese 
characteristics61 became influential. Such Chinese ideas of law have competed, among 
socialist countries, with more Soviet Union oriented laws. In North Korea, Soviet and 
Chinese legal influence coexisted.62 Vietnam’s legal development, especially in the 
rule of law context, followed more along China’s model than a presumed universal 
Western model, searching for Confucian values for a move forward.63 
Although both the tribute system and communism have withered, this idea of 
a plural Asian law under Chinese leadership is arguably still present, most 
prominently in the current Belt and Road project. 64  The project focuses on 
transnational trade and infrastructure, linking up to 70 countries in Asia, Europe, and 
Africa. A project like this also requires law, and it is in this law that we can see a revival 
of a traditional sinocentric concept of Asian law.  To some extent it may look as though 
China merely attempts to impose its own law on the initiative. The Chinese 
                                                        
58 W.E. Butler (ed.), The Legal System of the Chinese Soviet Republic 1931-
1934 (1983). 
59 Bui Ngoc Son, The Law of China and Vietnam in Comparative Perspective, 
(2017) 41 Fordham Int’l L. J. 135, 153ff. 
60 Shao-Chuan Leng, The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as 
Reflecting Mao Tse-Tung's Influence, (1977) 68 Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 356-373. 
61 Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics: China’s 
Discourse for the Rule of Law and a Bitter Experience, (2010) 24 Temple Int’l & 
Comp. L.J. 1-64; Zhu Jingwen, The Socialist Legal System with Chinese 
Characteristics: Its Structure, Features and Trends, (2011) 32 Social Sciences in 
China 87-103, English translation at 
http://en.theorychina.org/xsqy_2477/201306/t20130611_270446.shtml. 
62 See Darren C. Zook, Reforming North Korea: Law, Politics, and the Market 
Economy, 48 Stan. J. Int'l L. 131 (2012). 
63 Pham Duy Nghia, Confucianism and the conception of the law in Vietnam, 
in John Gillespie/Pip Nicholson (Eds), Asian Socialism and Legal Change: The 
dynamics of Vietnamese and Chinese Reform (2005) 76ff; see also John Gillespie, 
Changing concepts of socialist law in Vietnam, ibid. 45, 61ff. 
64 Tom Miller, China’s Asian Dream—Empire Building Along the New Silk 
Road (2017). 
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government has announced the establishment of three special courts: one for the silk 
road in Xi’an, one for the maritime road in Shenzhen, one headquarter in Beijing.65 In 
addition, a Belt and Road International Dispute Management Center will assist 
existing arbitration centers.66 A push is being made to establish Chinese, rather than 
English, law as the regularly applied law in arbitration.67 The Chinese Supreme Court 
has issued no less than sixteen “guiding opinions” as information on how to handle 
legal issues concerning the Belt and Road Initiative.68 
But the idea does not appear to be merely to expand the application of Chinese 
law. The concept endorsed by the Chinese government is not Chinese domination but 
rather “bringing the outside in.” (youwai zhinei). In this sense, the project is a 
sinocentric network—respecting difference, but under leadership of China, and thus 
ideally enhancing China’s power without limiting that of its neighbors.69 Xi Jinping 
explicitly advocated the project as one for a “community of shared destiny”—an Asian 
dream, within which each country and region is entitled to its own particular 
dreams.70 The International Academy of the Belt and Road published a book titled 
“The Dispute Resolution Mechanism for the Belt and Road” which puts forward a new 
system to “make up for the existing system and formulate a mechanism that can 
better reflect the culture, customs, traditions, legal systems and values of the 
countries along the Belt and Road”. 71  Such calls for mutual coordination, under 
leadership of China, are more reminiscent of the tributary system than of a mere 
                                                        
65 https://www.merics.org/en/blog/dispute-settlement-chinas-terms-
beijings-new-belt-and-road-courts. 
66 Ibid. 
67 See also more generally on the role for arbitration Tommi Yu, China’s “One 
Belt, One Road Initiative”: What’s in It for Law Firms and Lawyers?, The Chinese 
Journal of Comparative Law (2017) Vol. 5 No. 1 pp. 1-21; Patrick M. Norton, China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative: Challenges for Arbitration in Asia, 13 U. Pa. Asian L. Rev. 72 
(2018); Jingzhou Tao and Mariana Zhong, The Changing Rules of International 
Dispute Resolution in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, in Zhang W., Alon I., 
Lattemann C. (eds) China's Belt and Road Initiative. (2018) 305-320. 
68 See https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/belt-and-road/. More generally on the 
concept of guiding cases, see Chen Xingliang, China’s Guiding Case System—A Study 
on the Mechanisms of Rule Formation, (2014) 1 Peking University Law Journal 215-
258; DENG Jinting, Functional Analysis of China’s Guiding Cases, (2016) 14 China: 
An International Journal 44-70. 
69 William A. Callahan, China’s “Asia Dream”—The Belt Road Initiative and 
the new regional order, (2016) 1 Asia Journal of Comparative Politics 226-243. 
70 Ibid. at 235. 
71 https://beltandroad.blog/2017/11/26/how-will-china-shape-the-legal-
future-of-belt-and-road/; see also Guiguo Wang, The Belt and Road Initiative in 
quest for a dispute resolution mechanism, (2017) 25 Asia-Pacific Law Review 1-16. 
 15 
imposition of Chinese law.72 This looks like a sinocentric, not merely Chinese, model 
of Asian law—one that rests on cooperation rather than legal unification, and on 
attention to cultural differences rather than homogenization. 
The project is not confined to Asia; it includes African and European countries, 
as well as countries in the Pacific. Further,  although it is not explicitly directed against 
the West at large (though it does suggest an alternative to US domination). What 
makes it Asian is the fact that it is presented as an alternative to a particular Western 
conception of both economics and of international relations; the initiative is explicitly 
advertised as an alternative to Western neoliberalism.73  
IV. A Japanese Asia: Pan-Asian Law 
If the sinocentric idea of Asian law is one of difference, then a different idea of 
Asian law emphasizes similarity. Arguably, Prof. Kanayama’s quite different ideas of 
an Asian nature of the PACL, or rather the lack thereof, also have a broader 
background, though one to be found, originally, in Europe. His preference for a brief 
and abstract style of codification reflects experience with a European model, namely 
the French Civil Code, and reflects his own specialization: Prof. Kanayama holds a 
chair for French law his University. His idea of a restatement that is detached from 
local culture, potentially universal, reflects similar ideas of the French civil code.74 
And altogether, the suggestion that an Asian Restatement can be modelled closely 
after European models, only to improve on them where they appear deficient, reflects 
the old Japanese idea of emulating Europe in order to surpass it.  
                                                        
72 See also Su-Yan Pan & Joe Tin-Yau Lo, Re-conceptualizing China's rise as a 
global power: a neo-tributary perspective, (2017) 30 The Pacific Review 1-25. 
Tianxia has been proposed as a general model for global governance, especially by 
Zhao Tingyang, Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tian-
xia), Social Identities Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2006, pp. 29-41; see also William A. 
Callahan, Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?, 
(2008) 10 International Studies Review 749–761; Zhang Feng, The Tianxia System: 
World Order in a Chinese Utopia, (2010) 4 Global Asia: 108-112; Prasenjit DUara, The 
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73 He Yafei, “Belt & Road” v. Liberal Order (2017) 34 New Perspectives 
Quarterly 31-33. 
74 See Ralf Michaels, Code vs Code: Nationalist and Internationalist Images of 
the Code Civil in the French Resistance to a European Codification, (2012) 8 Eur. 
Rev. Contract L. 277-295. 
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This idea of Asia is reminiscent of earlier Japanese ideas of Pan-Asianism.75 
Indeed, although the idea of Asia emerged in Europe, it spurred a counterconcept in 
Asia, as a concept not to extend European influence but to resist it, as a promise of an 
identity that could be opposed to, withstand, that of Europe (and, slightly later, 
America). Japan had, in the 19th century, viewed the subjugation of once mighty China 
with a sense of horror, fearing a similar fate for itself. Not long after Commodore Perry 
forced Japan to open its ports for trade and the Tokugawa regime crumbled, the 
country, under the new Meiji regime, responded with a radical response of 
modernization, and that meant: westernization. This modernization included all 
aspects of public life, including, of course, the law. Japanese lawyers traveled to 
Europe and the United States in order to learn about Western laws. Professorships 
were established for various Western law: French law, common law, German law.76  
And, of course,  Japan adopted a whole series of new codes in civil and criminal law, 
strongly influenced Western, especially French and German law.77 
This well-known story has led comparative layers, not only from abroad, to 
proclaim that Japanese law would be, simply, civil law; it is still often described as 
such, also by Japanese scholars themselves.78 This suggests why we can think of Asian 
law as Western. But that, as we know, is misleading. First, the adoption of European 
law required a significant translation.79 Necessarily, even at the level of official law, 
Japanese law became a careful combination of foreign and domestic elements. 
Translations of civil codes were difficult because the concepts used were unfamiliar, 
down to basic issues like the concept of rights.80 The civil code may be mostly an 
                                                        
75 For an excellent collection of translated primary texts, see Sven Saaler & 
Christopher W.A. Szpilman (eds), Pan-Asianism—A Documentary History (2 Vols, 
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amalgam of French and German law,81 but the family system was based on traditional 
Japanese customs. Similarly, the Constitution was largely Prussian, but state 
Shintoism as the underlying constitutional identity, codified in the Rescript of 
Education, was intrinsically local.82 
Second, the westernization of Japan and the westernization of Japanese law 
must be understood within the broader context of politics, including geopolitics, of 
the time. Japan did not simply join the West, and Japanese law did not simply join the 
civil law tradition. Western observers easily overlook that westernization was not 
meant to enable Japan to join the West; it was meant to strengthen Japan so it could 
withstand Western colonization. The Western secularized and centralized state with 
its bureaucracy served as a forceful model of state success, and as a reason for the 
military success of European countries in colonizing much of the world. Whatever 
(cultural) superiority the Japanese saw for themselves, that superiority did not 
translate into competitiveness. The Meiji regime adopted elements of the Western 
state in view of its superior effectivity, but the goal was not so far to emulate the West 
as to keep it at bay. Adopting this model meant, for Japan, to step up to a similar level 
of development, and to achieve a similar level of strength. 
This interest clearly underlay law reform. One important goal of codification 
of civil law was to move beyond the unequal treaties that Japan, like China, had 
entered into with Western powers.83 Under these treaties, foreigners were exempt 
from the jurisdiction of Japanese courts and the application of Japanese law because 
these courts and laws were considered inferior and therefore not acceptable for 
Westerners. The ensuing system of extraterritoriality, under which Western 
countries had their own courts for their citizens in Japan, created a situation 
considered unbearable for a Japanese sense of pride and sovereignty. That created an 
important reason for a Westernization of Japanese laws.84 
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121-146. 
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This means that the Westernization of Japanese law did not lead to a 
submission to the West but rather the opposite: it was an anticolonialist move in that 
it justified the application of (albeit westernized) Japanese law to Westerners. What 
looks like Western law imposed on Japan to the careless comparative lawyer is 
actually appropriated law that becomes, through the process of Japanization, 
Japanese law.85 
Early 20h century Japanese attitudes can be grouped, with some 
simplification, into two seemingly opposite positions: “leaving Asia” and “leading 
Asia.” 86  The first idea, that of leaving Asia, is most famously linked to Yukichi 
Fukuzawas famous plea, in an editorial, for “Shedding Asia.”87  Fukuzawa—whose 
now famous essay was hardly discussed before it was revived after the second World 
War—88 did not call for joining Europe, however, and the Asia he wanted to leave 
behind was only the old Asia which had been unable to withstand Europe. The idea of 
leading Asia, on the other hand, draws on Japan’s modernization and new confidence, 
leading to claims for a united Asia—with Japan as its leader. “Asia is one” proclaimed 
Okakura in 1903,89 and this Asia was formulated as an alternative to Europe: Okakura 
juxtaposed the Western racist concept of a “yellow peril” with the countercomplaint 
over a “white disaster”. On closer perspective, therefore, both positions are closer to 
each other than one might think: for each of them, the old Asia has to be left behind 
and Japan has to endorse modernization. In this sense, the seeming opposition against 
Asia formulated by Fukuzawa does not stand in complete opposition to voices of 
others who argued for an Asian identity.90  
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 19 
Underlying this new Pan-Asianism was a (largely counterfactual) suggestion 
that Asia was racially and culturally uniform—and that its racial and cultural features 
were, largely, those of Japan. It was such ideas that were used for the subsequent 
Japanese colonization of large parts of East Asia and its role in World War II. Pan-
Asianism and the subsequent colonization project represented a remarkable 
intellectual step, described by one scholar as “Japan’s orient.” 91  Orientalist ideas 
about Asia, expressed at first by Europeans and imposed on Asia, were adopted and 
appropriated by intellectuals and politicians in Japan and elsewhere in Asia 
themselves. They thereby expanded on the European construct of a largely uniform 
Asia, in need of development through colonization.92 What differed was that now 
Japan, rather than Western powers, had the role of bringing about this development. 
What did not differ was that this idea of an Asian homogenous identity was a 
construct, built more on ideology than on empirical facts. The result was a curious, 
arguably internally incoherent, concept: Japanese Pan-Asianism rejected the West 
and at the same time adopted its tools and mechanism; it criticized the Western sense 
of racial and cultural superiority of Westerners over Asians, and at the same time 
endorsed a sense of superiority of Japanese over other nations in Asia. In this way it 
also created mixed reactions amongst those other Asian nations: they admired the 
Japanese resistance to the West and its endorsement of a pan-Asian civilization that 
could overcome the West, and they opposed a Japanese imperialism that continued 
the work of Western imperialists. 
Pan-Asianism spurred ideas for what can well be called pan-Asian law: a 
project of law convergence in Asia, modelled on Japanese law. Japanese imperialism 
is often, for obvious reasons, compared to the German Nazis. Yet at least insofar as 
law is concerned law, the more apt comparison may be with Napoleonic France. The 
Nazis had no great interest in exporting their laws; they were generally suspicious of 
law. Napoleon, by contrast, not only saw the Civil Code as one of his main 
achievements, he also actively advocated for its adoption as a European code—an odd 
amalgation of a nationalist and a transnationalist ideal. 93  And indeed, the French civil 
                                                        
(2013). On Fukuzawa and Okakura and the convergence of their thoughts, see, e.g., 
Sun Ge, How Does Asia Mean? (Part 1), (2000) 1 Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 13-47. 
91 Stefan Tanake, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (1993). 
92 E.g. Chao-Ju Chen, Producing ‘Lack as Tradition’: A Feminist Critique of 
Legal Orientalism in Colonial Taiwan, (2013) 1 Comparative Legal History 186-210. 
 
93 See Ralf Michaels, Code vs Code: Nationalist and Internationalist Images of 
the Code Civil in the French Resistance to a European Codification, (2012) 8 Eur. 
Rev. Contract L. 277-295. 
 20 
Code was adopted elsewhere through different means—sometimes through 
conquest, sometimes through persuasion, sometimes through inspiration.94 
We can find similar developments with regards to Western law as adopted by 
Japan. In the same way in which Japanese expansion in Asia represented an internal 
colonization, its export of Japanese laws created a secondary wave of transplant of 
civil law. To some extent it was exported through conquest as a consequence of 
Japanese imperialism. After colonizing Taiwan in 1895, the Japanese reformed 
Taiwanese law, first through a mixture of civil-law based ideas of customary law and 
colonial laws, later through direct expansion of Japanese law—and thus, indirectly, 
on a civil law model.95 The situation in Korea was somewhat similar, even though 
Korea was at first considered, at least nominally, sovereign: Western law (including 
the idea of customary law) was imposed through its Japanese version. 96  Finally, 
Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet state in China, was justified in large part on legal 
grounds: Manchuria, it was said, needed modern law, and this could come only from 
Japan, not from China.97 As a consequence, its new law codes resembled closely those 
in Japan.98 (Remarkably, the Japanese did not terminate the unequal treaties granting 
Western nationals special extraterritorial rights, but rather extended this principle of 
extraterritoriality to themselves.)99 
In all these cases, Western-Japanese law came about as a matter of imposition, 
but it was not confined to that. Often, this law was also viewed as superior and as 
necessary for economic modelling. Thus, in Manchukuo, many locals supported the 
idea of sovereign (Japanese) stewardship in order to bring about modernization—
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and establish stronger opposition to the West. 100  Koreans were fascinated with 
German legal thought after the triumph in the French-German war and thus eager 
themselves to modernize their laws in face of this model—which happened to 
resemble the Meiji model.101  And indeed, just like the French Civil Code, Japanese-
Western law was exported not just through conquest but also through inspiration.  
Japan, at the end of the 19th century, was a country that had been able to modernize 
in record time, had managed to avoid the fate of China, a country whose navy was able 
to defeat a European nation (Russia) in the battle of Tsushima.102 The fascination with 
the success of Japanese modernization had impacts, including in law. Chinese law 
reformers of the Qing dynasty began to look to Japanese law (and thus indirectly to 
European law) for inspiration.103 In this sense, if European law became influential in 
much of Europe, this happened to a large extent in its Japanese form. 
The result was a partial unification of law in East Asia on civil law models. 
Given the background, it would therefore not appear fully accurate to understand the 
adoption of civil law in East Asian countries as a mere adoption of Western law, as 
joining a European legal tradition. Western law indeed influenced East Asian 
countries significantly, but it did so at least in part by way of what can be called a 
secondary reception: a reception of Japanese law, which itself had been received from 
the West.104 The result, in this regard, is less a mere adoption of civil law and more an 
establishment of a Pan-Asian law—civilian in form, but Asian in its attitude.  
Pan-Asianism of course led into Japanese imperialism and then into the 
catastrophe of the second World War. That war, and Japan’s complete moral and 
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military defeat, shattered any sense of Japanese superiority. After the defeat, any 
Japanese aspiration for an Asia-wide Empire became as implausible in Japan as would 
be the readiness of other Asian countries to accept this. This may also be why, at least 
to an outside observer, it appears that both Japanese and non-Japanese scholars alike 
often tend to downplay the role that Japan had in the introduction of civilian systems 
in Korea and elsewhere—even though their subsequent development was 
independent.105  
To the extent that ideas of Japanese Pan-Asianism still exist (or are 
rediscovered), they tend to come without the imperial ambition of earlier times.106 
Today, the Japanese approach to law reform in other Asian countries is unusual for 
the degree to which the Japanese are willing to defer to local interests: The starting 
point for Japanese legal aid is not so much the model of their own law (as is the case 
for much law reform elsewhere) but instead the local needs and traditions of the 
respective country. 107 The idea that law in Asia should be unified under Japanese 
leadership and after the Japanese model would appear highly implausible. However, 
this leaves the idea of  Pan-Asian law not without any influence. On the one hand, 
much law in East Asia remains indeed somewhat similar at least superficially, insofar 
as it is civilian. This represents a remnant of the Japan-led Pan-Asianism. On the other 
hand, this civilian character of law comes without a deeper aspiration towards a 
political entity led by Japan. 
In this sense, civil law in Asian countries now seems to hold a curious 
existence: it is linked neither to European civilization (which it never embodied), nor 
to Japanese projects of Pan-Asianism (which have failed). It remains, in that sense, a 
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formal remnant. Kanayama’s perspective that this law does not represent Asia in any 
meaningful sense becomes plausible against this specific historical background. 
V. An Essentialist Asia: Asian Values 
It seems appropriate, thirdly, to discuss at least briefly what is arguably the 
most well-known recent concept of an Asian identity of Asian law, namely the idea of 
Asian values. Asian values were promoted in in the 1980s and 1990s, under the 
leadership of Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad, then Prime Ministers of 
Singapore and Malaysia respectively, as well as other leaders in the region. The main 
argument was that Asian society was governed by values drawn from Confucianism, 
and that political and legal systems in Asia would function best when in accordance 
with these values. Underlying this suggestion was an identity claim: Asian identity 
brought together different cultures in Asia and at the same time distinguished them 
from the West. 
The idea was, in some ways, a continuation of the earlier two. It took up the 
Japanese idea of a Pan-Asanism and combined it both with Confucianism as a 
sinocentric idea and the idea of a pluralism that could account for buddhism, 
Hinduism, and Islam as well. Indeed, although Pan-Asianism started off with an 
adoption of European over Asian models of governance, the idea of Asian values had 
(and still has) supporters among Japanese conservatives 108  At the same time, 
however, the idea of Asian values represented a powerful new idea. It was voiced 
after the end of colonization in Asia, and in response to the quick rise of Asian 
economies that were now becoming competitors to Western countries. It is, in this 
sense, the most explicit formulation of an Asian identity of law. 
Situated in this competition, it becomes clear that the idea of Asian values, 
even more so than its two predecessors, was directed, at least nominally, against the 
West, and against what was perceived as colonial ideas. The economic success of Asia 
seemed like a powerful refutation of European ideas about Asian intrinsic 
backwardness. If Max Weber had suggested that Asian values were anathema to 
development, did not the existing development suggest that they were actually 
conducive? And, further, that they therefore provide a valid alternative to Western 
values? 
Western countries had criticized Asian countries for neglecting human rights 
and democracy, often also for strategic purposes. Asian values were a response to 
both criticisms. As concerns human rights, the relation is complicated. The Bangkok 
Declaration of 1993, a leading document of the Asian Values debate, did not reject the 
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idea of human rights or their universal character at least at an abstract level. 109 
Instead, the carefully crafted document suggested “that the promotion of human 
rights should be encouraged by cooperation and consensus, and not through 
confrontation and the imposition of incompatible values.” What this meant was that 
the particular conception of human rights espoused by the West was not universal in 
nature and should therefore not be imposed on Asian countries. 110  As concerns 
democracy, Asian values were invoked in favor of a governance structure that is 
strong on development but relatively weak on individual rights, a structure that Bui 
Ngoc Son calls Confucian Constitutionalism and Mark Tushnet has recently called 
authoritarian constitutionalism.111 Such systems rest on powerful executive branches 
to deliver stability and internal security and invoke a strong rule of law as concerns 
commercial interests, in particular the protection of property rights, the enforcement 
of contracts. They are weak, by contrast, on democratic participation, which is, like 
individual human rights, viewed as being in the way of both economic development 
and an Asian sense of harmony.  
The idea of Asian values has not, to my knowledge, been linked to the project 
of contract harmonization, or indeed commercial law more generally. Sundaresh 
Menon, speaking about legal unification, invokes diversity of national laws as a 
potential impediment; a cultural unity of Asia is not mentioned.112 Even Han, when he 
promotes an Asian character for the PACL, names only specific doctrinal peculiarities 
of Asian laws, without invoking deeper underlying Asian values. 
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One reason for the absence of a reference to Asian values may be that they play 
no role in this area.113 But another reason is the decline of the idea of Asian values in 
general. The international appeal of the idea of Asian values lost force in view of the 
Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. Domestically, it retained strength for some 
time in supporting autocratic regimes’ defenses against democracy movement.114 
Today, however, it is mostly rejected as another artificial construct. Worse, the idea 
of Asian values essentializes an idea that is at the same time incompatible with the 
internal diversity of Asia and retains, through its opposition, the focus on Europe. 
Indeed, forceful arguments have been made that the discourse on Asian values was 
also used strategically: that it was primarily used not against the West, but instead 
against local opposition. Amartya Sen argued that the idea of democracy is universal, 
even if the particular way in which it is incorporated is not.115 Similar arguments have 
been made with regard to human rights; the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration of 
2012, despite its shortcomings, no longer invokes Asian values. 116  Seen like this, 
Asian values represent less a fight of East versus West, and more one of 
authoritarianism versus democracy.117 Thus, it may be the case that many people in 
Asia reject Western-style democracy based on the values they hold,118 but this would 
not be different from discussions in the West. 
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VI. Beyond Essence: Asia as Method? 
What follows from this overview? My conclusions are tentative, as they must 
be. 
First, even if Asia and Asian law are constructs, the question for an Asian 
identity of Asian law does not appear entirely useless. Granted, a cultural Asian law 
that would be structurally comparable to European law does not exist. It is not 
possible to speak of Asian law in the same way in which it is possible to speak of 
European law. Such ideas are European projections. But that does not mean that the 
search for an Asian identity is fruitless, and the fact that scholars within Asia invoke 
some kind of Asian identity suggests as much. I have suggested three models of such 
an Asian identity: pan-Asian law, sinocentric law, Asian values. None of these models 
resembles the European model of cultural identity. Asian values were adopted in 
explicit rejection of European ideas of universalism. The sinocentric model is more 
one of a specific type of Empire than of the nation state. Even Japanese Pan-Asianism, 
in the way in which it appropriated Western ideas of statehood, cannot be explained 
fully in those terms. Moreover, all of these concepts are inherently problematic. But 
this does not make them unworthy of study, quite to the contrary. 
Second, all these concepts stand in a certain relation to Western expansion and 
must be understood, at least in part, as responses to the West. To cite Wang Hui again, 
“the idea [of Asia] is at once colonialist and anticolonialist, conservative and 
revolutionary, nationalist and internationalist, originating in Europe and, 
alternatively, shaping Europe's image of itself”119 On the one hand, Japanese pan-
Asianism is a transplant from the West at the macro level, in the same way in which 
specific legal doctrines in Japanese law are such transplants at the micro level. What 
we have learned at the micro level should also help us at the macro level: the 
transplant does not leave the nature of the transplanted object intact; it changes it 
and adapts it to local circumstances. Therefore, the similarity of Japanese and 
Japanese-influenced law with European law is only superficial, as is the similarity of 
an Asian identity of law with a European identity of law. On the other hand, not only 
the idea of Asian values is formulated as an explicit rejection of Western law and 
Western values. The same is true for sinocentric law, which invokes ancient 
(precolonial ideas) today in explicit rejection of Western concepts. Their origins may 
be ancient, but their use is modern.  
Third, however, despite this importance of relations to the West, to analyze 
the concepts only in this relation, or, worse, to essentialize them, would recapture the 
mistake of European orientalism. All these concepts are problematic insofar as they 
remain, like the European projection, focused on Europe as the yardstick and the 
perspective. If anything characterizes Asia as a region, it is its plurality – of views, of 
traditions, of governance structures, of cultures and laws. There are many Asian legal 
traditions not one; there are many Asian laws not one. Any homogeneous concept of 
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Asia, and thus of Asian law, seems inadequate in view of this plurality. All three 
concepts discussed here have, in the past, been used for either hegemonic or 
antidemocratic purposes. And all of these concepts are contested internally—in fact, 
although I attributed the different concepts of law loosely to specific countries, such 
different concepts can be found within each country. In short, concepts of an Asian 
legal identity must be seen as positions within internal political struggles and must 
also be understood with regard to those. European comparative lawyers are aware of 
this from the European context; we should not be surprised to find this elsewhere. 
There is, in fact, a concept of Asia that may help such a perspective. It was first 
formulated by Yoshimi Takeuchi, a Japanese literary scholar who edited the first 
collection of writings on Asianism in the 1960 and provided an influential analysis of 
the concept.120  Takeuchi called his concept “Asia as method,” 121  and although he 
modestly suggested that “it is impossible to definitively state what this might 
mean,” 122  some elements become clear. Takeuchi differentiated two kinds of 
modernization in Asia—the Japanese one, which superficially imposed foreign 
(Western) achievements on a deeper societal structure left largely intact, and the 
Chinese one, begun later (1919), but deeper, because it emerged from society itself. 
This perspective enabled an inner-Asian comparison that went beyond the focus on 
Europe. The West remained an element of such an idea of Asia, but not more than 
that, and it lost its logical and epistemological priority:  
The concept of Asia as method was later taken up by Taiwanese scholar Kuan-
hsing Chen.123 Following Stuart Hall,124 Chen strongly opposed a perspective in which 
the West provided the universal standard and Asia was viewed as a particular, and he 
opposes ideas of Asia that, in one way or another, Europe as a reference point.125 This 
means also, for him, to view Asia as a locus of the local and the global alike: analyses 
of Asia are also analyses of the world, and vice versa. The West is neither dominant 
over nor absent from Asia. Instead, Chen “posits the West as bits and fragments that 
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intervene in local social formations in a systematic, but never totalizing, way.”126 The 
consequence is a possibility to move beyond a focus on the West, and at the same time 
to overcome ideas of Asian homogeneity: 
 “using the idea of Asia as an imaginary anchoring point, societies in Asia can 
become each other’s points of reference, so that the understanding of the self 
may be transfordmed, and subjectively rebuilt. On this basis, the diverse 
historical experiences and rich social practices of Asia may be mobilized to 
provide alternative horizons and perspectives.”127 
I am not aware of applications of this idea in legal unification.128 This chapter 
is not the one to develop the idea in full. If anything, the analysis has demonstrated 
how easily the Western comparative lawyer can go astray by assuming that questions 
have the same meaning in foreign areas as they do at home. Even the use of the term 
convergence, as opposed to harmonisation or unification, may represent a non-
European twist that the comparatists is bound to miss.129  There is, in fact, a debate 
about the question of how Asian Asian law should be, inherent in convergence 
discussion though not always in these terms. But it is a debate that looks very 
different from the debate of how European European law is.  
Asia as method would suggest less focus on comparison with the West and 
more comparison within Asia.130 The focus would no longer be on the clash between 
Western and local law as such, it would not merely measure the mere difference 
between Asian and European law, and instead decenter both East and West131. It 
would undermine the tacit assumption, found not only in Western comparatists, that 
Western law is universal and Asian law is particular.132 Developments in Asian law 
would no longer be reduced to degrees of Westernization and instead be seen on their 
own terms. 133 The debate between Han and Kanayama reference above would not be 
reduced to a debate about the European versus Asian character of the PACL and 
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instead would enable an intra-Asian comparison of different concepts of Asian law, in 
which the West is one of multiple elements. And an emerging Asian law would in turn 
be fruitful for the Western observer, not merely as an object, but as a perspective on 
the West itself, and on modernity. As Takeuchi formulates, 
Rather the Orient must re-embrace the West, it must change the West 
itself in order to realize the latter's outstanding cultural values on a greater 
scale. Such a rollback of culture or values would create universality. The Orient 
must change the West in order to further elevate those universal values that 
the West itself produced. This is the main problem facing East-West relations 
today, and it is at once a political and cultural issue134 
At this stage, the question asked at the beginning of this chapter – how Asian should 
Asian law be – has led in perhaps unexpected directions. It has generated a fruitful 
discussion—it is not a useless question. But the question has, through the analysis, 
changed its character: Asia is no longer object or subject but method, no longer one 
but many parts that are in dialogue with each other, no longer recipient or opponent 
of Western law and instead co-producer of modernity and of modern law. In this, the 
West has at least as much to learn from Asia as Asia did from the West. 
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